Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Arthur Graham v. Evan E. Street and Max Siegel :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
George B. Stanley; David L. McKay; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Graham v. Street, No. 7883 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1797

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

~/

... SS3

IN THE SUPREME '~

or

the

STATE OF

LED

J.4N 1 C)

UTA'~----------------~

,

r:;q

.-~ ~·

erk, Sul'rerne·c·········•w••w ..........
ourt, Utah

ARTHUR GRAHAM,
I

Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Apellant,

vs.

Case No.
7883

EVAN E. STREET and MAX
SIEGEL,
Defendants and Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

BRIEF .OF RESPONDENT, ARTHUR GRAHAM

GEORGE B. STANLEY
DAVID L. McKAY
Attorneys for Respondent,
Arthur Graham
~MMeeeooeoooo~oeoooeooeeooeeooe

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
'mE LAW OF THE CASE ----------------------------------------···························· 1
POINTS RELIED UPON ........................................................................ 15
ARGUMENT ·---------··------·--·--------------···············································------------- 17
POINT I.
The district court failed to follow the law of the case
established by the supreme court in the appeal from the
interlocutory decree heretofore entered herein .......................... 17
A. The contention of defendants and the findings of
the court that the action was for a partnership
accounting only is contrary to the law of the case ...... 17

B. The purported accountings filed by the defendants
were not in accordance with the interlocutory decree
on file herein, and are contrary to the law of the
case, inasmuch as the defendant, Max Siegel, was
not a partner in the partnership of Graham and
Street and is not entitled to defend and account in
this action as a partner, and for the further reason
that both defendants in their original answers and
in the first trial herein repudiated the existence of
a partnership and are now estopped from asking
relief on the basis of a partnership agreement which
they both denied was ever made, as the only basis
of settlement herein ·······························--------------·--·········--· 29
POINT II.
The proper measure of accounting in this action is judgment for the value of the equipment taken at the time of
the taking, for damages for the value of the use thereof,
for the value of the contracts of the partnership appropriated by Siegel to his own use, for damages for disrupting
the partnership business, and for exemplary damages ............ 39
A. The proper measure of accounting in this action for
the unlawful taking of the equipment by Siegel is
the value of the equipment taken at the time of the
taking ------·····------·------------------------------·---------······················------ 42

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued)
Page
B. The proper measure of accounting in this action for
the detention of the equipment by the defendant,
Siegel, is the rental value thereof while so detained by Siegel ·········-···----------··----------·----·-······-----·----------···· 43
C. The proper measure of accounting in this action for
the fraudulent appropriation of the partnership contracts by Siegel to his own use is the total receipts
received by him on these contracts -----------·-----·---·-----····· 53
D. The defendants should account to the partnership
for damages caused for disrupting the partnership
business --------·------·---·-···-·-·-·---·-··---------------·----·--------·-------------·--- 57
E. The partnership should be allowed exemplary damages for the fraud of the defendents ---------------·--··-·-····· 58

POINT III.

It was error for the lower court to allow Max Seigel
rental value for the conveyor-loader ---·---------------·-----------·-·---··· 59
POINT IV.
The plaintiff proved all of the allegations of his supple
mental complaint and should have been awarded judgment
in accordance therewith ---------------·----······---------··--··--·-·-·---·--···----·-· 62
POINT V.
The lower court failed to follow the mandate of the supreme court in the appeal from the Interlocutory Decree
heretofore entered herein that the defendents should not be
allowed to profit from their own wrong. ·------·------···-·---·----·····---· 63
POINT VI.
The judgement entered on July 12th, 1952, herein does
not make the plaintiff, Graham, whole ·----------------------·------------ 64
CONCLUSION ----··-··---·-····-----···---····-----·····----··············-······-···-------------------- 65

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUTHORITIES CITED
Page
115 A. L. R. 1322 .................................................................................... 25
10 Am. Rep. 641 .................................................................................... 47
54 Am. St. Rep. 598 ................................................................................ 58
Hayne, New Trial & App. No. 291 ........................................................ 2
Ann. Cas. 1917B, ·1190 ............................................................................ 58
29 L. Ed. 940 ............................................................................................ 56
38 L. Ed. 814 ............................................................................................ 58
L. R. A. 1915 C, 319 ................................................................................ 45
L. R. A. 191GB, 868 .................................................................................... 58
40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 494 ........................................................................ 58
46 L. R. A. (N. S. ) 469 ........................................................................ 57
23 R. C. L. 904 ........................................................................................ 47
3 Suth. Damages, No. 1144 ........................................................ 27, 28, 44
STATUTES CITED
Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, No. 6864 ....................................................
Rev. St. 1933, 104-16-1 et seq. .. ..........................................................
Rev. St. 1933, 104-30-11 ........................................................................
69-1-18, U. C. A. 1943 ................................................................................
104-14-3, U. C. A. 1943 ............................................................................
104-30-11, U. C. A. 1943 .................................................................... 24,

26
25
47
38
18
42

CASES CITED
Allen v. Fox, 1873, 51 N. Y. 562, 10 Am. Rep. 641 ........................
Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble et al., 153 U. S. 540, 14 S. Ct. 876,
38 L. Ed. 814 ........................................................................................
Beck v. Lee, 172 Pac. 686 ........................................................................
Bishop-Babcock-Becker Co. v. Estes Drug Co., 63 Okl. 117,
163 P. 276 ............................................................................................
Border City Ice & Coal Co. v. Adams, 69 Ark. 219, 62 S. W. 591.. ..
Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Cunningham (Ariz.) 238 P. 332 ............
Cook v. Lowery, 95 N. Y. 103 ............................................................
Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co., 88 Con. 592, 92 A. 413 L. R. A.
1915C, 319 ............................................................................................
Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah, 186, 189
P. 873 ............................................................ 26, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50,
Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 379, 260 P. 869 ................
Dwight v. Enos, 9 N. Y. 470 ................................................................

47
58
45
58
58
45
56
45
53
52
47

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED-(Continued)
Page
Farrand & Votey v. M. E. Church, 18 Utah, 18 Utah 34,
54 Pac. 819 --------------------------------------------------------------------··--·--- 27, 28, 44
Guerin v. Kirst, 202 P. 2d, 10 --·--------------------------------------··········-----·--- 51, 52
Fitzhugh v. Wiman, 9 N. Y. 559 -----------·----·------------·-············---·-·----------· 47
Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Williams, 30 Okl. 726, 121 P. 275,
40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 494 ---·---------------------------------------------------·-------------------- 58
Fuller v. Abbe, 105 Wis. 235, 81 N. W. 401 -·------·------··---------------·------· 56
Graham v. Street, 166 P. 2d. 524 --------------------------------------------······-····· 7
Hammand v. Thompson, 54 Mont. 609, 173 Pac. 229 .................... 45
Hanna v. Clark, 204 Pa. 145, 53 A. 757 ····----··-··-···-····················-··--· 56
Haycroft v. Adams, 82 Utah, 347, 24 Pac. 2d, 1110 ............................ 58
Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 6 S. ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940 ........ 56
Hunt v. Cohen (Okl.) 179 Pac. 1 --··-·-·························--········-···--·-······ 45
Johnson Oil Refining Co. of Illinois et al. v. Elledge (Oklahoma)'
53 P. (2d), 543 ·················--···---··-··-··············--·--····-····························· 57
Kunz v. Nelson, et al., 94 U. 185, 76 P. 2d 115, 115 A. L. R.
1322 --··············--····--·-------·---·-·················---------···-··········-···········-· 25, 45, 47
Lehman v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 27, 42 N. E. 777 ·-········--··--·-·············· 56
McClellan v. Crook, 7 Gill, 338 ·············-···--··················-------··-················· 2
McGinnis v. Stud~baker Corporation of America, 75 Or. 519,
146 P. 825, 147 P. 525, L. R. A. 1916B, 868 Ann Cas. 1917B, 1190.... 58
Murphy v. Booth, 36 Utah, 285, 103 P. 768, 770 ............................ 58
Montgomery v. Gallas, 225 SW., 557 ····-------··············---·---················ 51
Nahas v. Browning (Cal.) 183 Pac. 442 ··--·--········-········------···-·· 27, 45
Paolo Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 622, 44 P.
621, 54 Am. St. Rep. 598 ···········----···-··················--············--------····· 58
Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo., 171, 20 P. 251 ·-····-·········---·-------·········---- 56
Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 68 Utah, 30, 249 P. 121 --------·-······ 45, 49
Silva v. Pickard, et al. 14 Utah, 245, 47 Pac. 144 -----········----------- 2, 35
Royer v. Dobbins (Oklahoma) 239 P. 157 ·········-·······------------------····· 56
Snow v. Hazelwood, 179 F. 182, 102 C. C. A. 448 ··········----·-············ 56
Somerset Ry. v. Pierce, 98 Me. 258, 57 A. 888 ·-······--------···----------------- 56
Stone v. Farnham, 22 R. I. 225, 47 A. 211 ---------·-··-----------·-··---------------- 56
Street et. al. v. Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County ____ 12
Tannahill v. Lydon, 31 Idaho, 608, 173 Pac. 1146 -················--------------- 45
Tucker v. Hagerty, 37 Ca. App. 789, 792, 174 P. 908 ····-------···-· 45, 52
Wasatch Oil R~ining Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah, 50, 63 P. 2, 1070 .... 25
Wellington v. Spencer, 37 Okl. 461, 132 P. 675, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 469 .................................................................................... 57, 58
Young v. Frost, 1 Md. 304 -···········---······················------···················------

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR GRAHAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Apellant,

vs.

Case No.
7883

EVAN E. STREET and MAX
SIEGEL,
Defendants and Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ARTHUR GRAHAM
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT
In this brief, the respondent and cross-appellant, Arthur
Graham, will be called the plaintiff, and the appellants and
cross-respondents will be called the defendants.
Inasmuch as there was a former appeal herein concerning the Interlocutory Decree (Rec. 89-91) the plaintiff will
proceed in this brief in accordance with the rule laid down
1
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in the case of Silva v. Pickard, et. al., 14 Utah, 245, 47 Pac.
144, which states:
The court cannot recall the case, and reverse its decision, after the remittitur is issued. It has determined the principles of law which shall govern, and,
having thus determined, its jurisdiction in that respect is gone. Young v. Frost, 1 Md. 304; McClellan
v. Crook, 7 Gill, 338; Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 417;
Hayne, New Trial & App. No. 291.
This being so, the former appeal establishes the following as
THE LAW OF THE CASE.
1. That a partnership was entered into by Arthur
Graham, plaintiff herein, and Evan E. Street, defendant
herein, on August 6th, 1943, to be known by the name and
style of Graham & Street, and that said partnership has
since that date existed and does now exist and has not at
any time been dissolved. (Rec. 87, par. 14; Rec. 89, par. 1.)
(Rec. 82, par 5.)
2. That the partnership capital assets at its inception
consisted of the following described property:
One (1) RD 7 Caterpiller Tractor, No. 9G1531SP
One (1) LeTourneau Angle Dozer, or Bull Dozer
One. (1) Model M Two drum Le Tourneau Power
controlled unit.
One (1) Austin Weston Ripsnorter pull blade (road
grader).
2
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One (1) Scarrifier.
(Rec. 82, par. 4; Rec. 89, par 2.)
3. That on August 6th, 1943 the defendant, Max Siegel,
loaned the partnership the sum of $4,500.00, and he took
blank notes and mortgages from the co-partners and received a bill of sale from the Bothwell Construction Company for the above equipment listed in item 2 above to secure
the payment of the said sum of $4,500.00, due one year
after date with interest at 9% per annum, and thereby
became a mortgagee of the partnership capital assets. (Rec.
82-84, par 6.) Other property was also given as security in
addition to the above listed property.
4. That on or about September 22nd, 1943, defendant,
Siegel, told .Plaintiff that he, Siegel, was the sole owner of
the said partnership capital assets. (Rec. 85, par 9.)
5. That on September 29th, 1943, defendant, Siegel,
wrote a letter to plaintiff returning his additional security
and statin~:
"In August you left in our office a title to your 1939
Ford Pickup, Motor No. 4833047. This was at the
time when you, Mr. Street and myself were discussing the advisability of my purchasing a caterpillar
from Mr. Bothwell so that the three of us could
enter into an agreement to operate this caterpillar.
"Since you did not come in as you agreed to enter
into a contract for the operation of the caterpillar
which I bought, I am returning the above mentioned
title to you with this letter."
(Rec. 85, par. 10: Plaintiff's Exhibit C.)

3
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6. That plaintiff was a partner in the partnership of
Clyde, Probst & Graham, which was, prior to the entering
into the partnership of Graham & Street, operating an excavating and other business with tractors, bulldozers and
road graders in connection therewith, in and about American Fork, Utah. (Rec. 81, par 1.)
7. That defendant, Evan E. Street, was an employee of
the firm of Clyde, Probst & Graham prior to the making
of the partnership agreement of Graham & Street. (Rec.
81, par. 2.)
8. That plaintiff turned over to the partnership of
Graham & Street the business theretofore operated by
Clyde, Probst & Graham, and the contracts for work which
were being performed by said co-partnership. (Rec. 81,
par. 3; Rec. 82, par. 5.)
9. "That from and since August 23rd, 1943, the defendants have conspired to take possession of the partnership property of Graham & Street, to collect and mis-appropriate the funds earned in the operation of the equipment on
the contracts of Graham & Street, and to exclude plaintiff
from any management or control of said partnership business, and have continued to operate the said partnership
equipment and business until January 12th, 1945, collect all
monies from the operation thereof and appropriate said
monies to their own use." (NOTE: The property of the
partnership of Graham & Street consisted of that listed in
item 2 above, and the contracts which were turned over to
the said partnership by the plaintiff which were originally
4
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owned by Clyde, Probst and Graham. The business consisted of the going operation which existed prior to the
formation of the partnership of Graham and Street.)
(Rec. 86, par 11.) (NOTE: The date of August 23rd is
set from Plaintiff's Exhibit G.)
10. That on or about the 12th day of January, 1945,
the said defendant, Max Siegel, with the consent of the
defendant, Evan E. Street, but without the consent or
knowledge of the plaintiff, sold all of the partnership equipment hereinabove set forth to Roberts & Ferguson, of Utah
County, Utah, for the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($6,500.00) ." (NOTE: The sale included for the
price which was received a conveyor loader and pickup
truck which are not listed as assets in item 2 above. Siegel
paid $2,000.00 for the items not listed.) (Rec. 86, par. 11;
Plaintiff's Exhibit I.)
11. That the monies paid to Max Siegel by the Ohran
Construction Company and the final payment representing
the suit of Evan Street against the said Construction Company being Civil No. 13049 in evidence herein, were monies
due to the firm of Graham & Street. (Rec. 86, par 12.)
12. That subsequent to August 23rd, 1943, the defendant, Max Siegel, has collected all monies earned in the operation of said equipment, and has retained all of the profits
of the operation of the said equipment and partnership
business. (Rec. 86, par 13.)
13. That the defendent, Evan E. Street, operated the
5
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said equipment from August 16th, 1943, until January 12th,
1945 (Rec. 86, par. 13), and that said defendant, Max
Siegel, still retains monies belonging to the said Evan E.
Street from the agreement of conspiracy between them,
pending the outcome of this action. (Rec. 86-87, par. 13.)
14. That plaintiff has never relinquished any interest
in the partnership of Graham & Street, nor the property
belonging to said partnership. (Rec. 87, par. 14.)
15. That the note given the mortgagee, Siegel, has
never been paid, and the mortgage given to secure said note
has never been foreclosed. (Rec. 87, par. 15.)
16. That plaintiff has requested the defendents and
each of them to cease to collect money belonging to the
partnership, and misappropriate the same to their own use,
and to deposit the money heretofore collected by them in
the partnership account of Graham & Street, and that said
defendants and each of them have heretofore neglected and
refused, and yet do neglect and refuse to account for the
money collected, and do continue to conspire between themselves in order to deprive the plaintiff of his rightful interest
in the money belonging to the said partnership from the
operation OF THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS AND THE
SALE OF THE PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY; (Rec. 87,
par. 16.)
17. That by a sale of the partnership property, DE
FENDANTS HAVE DEPRIVED THE PARTNERSHIP OF
THE REASONABLE EARNINGS OF THE PARTNER6
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SHIP PROPPERTY. (Rec. 87, par. 16.)
18. That there is now due and owing to Max Siegel on
the promissory note set forth in item 3 above, (Rec. 87, par.
177; Rec. 88, par 4), the sum of $4,500.00 plus interest at
9% per annum from and after August 6th, 1943.
19. As a conclusion of law from the foregoing matters,
the lower court and this supreme court held that "the
plaintiff is entitled to an interlocutory decree of this court
requiring the defendants, and each of them, to account for
all monies which they have collected from the operation
OF THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS AND EQUIPMENT
AND EQUIPMENT PURCHASED TO BE USED IN
CONNECTION THEREWITH, and for all reasonable profits from which the partnership has been deprived by reason
of the unauthorized and wrongful sale of the partnership
capital assets. (Rec. 87-88, par. 2)
20. That this (district) court retain jurisdiction in
this cause to settle all accounts between the parties hereto,
to dissolve the partnership of Graham & Street, and to make
such further orders, judgments and decrees as may be just
and equitable in the premises, to the end that a full and
complete settlement of the entire controversy existing between and among the parties shall be made. (Rec. 90,
par. 6.)
21. That the defendants and each of them be required
to file an account of the matters set forth in the Interlocutory Decree (Rec. 89-90) .
7
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The above are matters taken from the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and the Interlocutory Decree (Rec. 8191.) In addition to these, the following are taken from the
opinion of this supreme court appearing in 166 P. 2d 524,
and in the Record from 438 to 442; which are quoted as
follows:
22. "This is an action in equity to have declared by
decree the partnership between Graham and Street; to have
the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself as owner declared as fraudulent; and to make Siegel account for that
property or the proceeds thereof as GrahamStreet partnership property and for an accounting as to profits therefrom
while it was controlled by Siegel conniving with the allegedly
faithless Street." (Emphasis ours. Opinion of this court
page 4, next to last paragraph on page, Rec. back of page
439.) This is the basis of the accounting which should be
made, by the defendant Siegel.
23. "Odly enough, the defendants do not assign as error
the finding No. 11 that 'defendants have conspired to take
possession of the partnership property of Graham and
Street, TO COLLECT AND MISAPPROPRIATE THE
FUNDS EARNED IN THE OPERATION OF THE EQUIPMENT ON THE CONTRACTS OF GRAHAM & STREET,
and to exclude plaintiff from the management or controll of
said partnership business, and have continued to operate
the said partnership equipment and business until January
12th, 1945, collect all monies from the operation thereof
8
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and appropriate said monies to their own use.'" (Emphasis
ours. Opinion of this court page 6, third paragraph, Rec.
back of page 440.)
24. "The fraud consists in Siegel using his title as a
lever to exact more from Graham than the interest agreed
upon and that for such purpose he either took the title with
a secret intention of so doing, or, after taking title for security purposes only, later conceived of the scheme to use
it for such exaction, and not succeeding in getting Graham
to agree to a modification of what was a loan agreement
he then used his title in connivance with Street to divert
what was in reality Graham-Street equipment charged with
a loan from that partnership, TO IDS OWN PURPOSES."
(Emphasis ours. Opinion of this court, page 4, near end
of first paragraph, Rec. back of page 439.)
25. "Street did not notify Graham that the partnership
was at an end." (Rec. 442.)
26. "In this case Street used property belonging to
the partnership, treating it as belonging to Siegel, refrusing
to account to Graham for the monies collected for the use
of the tractor, but the property will in equity be cons:dered
as being used for the benefit of the Graham-Street partnership and accounting of profits required to be made to this
partnership." This is the measure of the account of Street
only and does not include any accounting for Siegel in connection with the partnership. (Rec. 442.)
Subsequent to the handing down of the remittitur on
9
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July 29th, 1946, in case No. 6863 in this court (Rec. 434),
the following matters took place:
Order for Accounting (Rec. 432).
Accounting of Max Siegel (Rec. 6-7) Filed September 3rd, 1946.
Account of Defendant Evan Street (Rec. 8-16) Filed
September 3rd, 1946.
Objections to Accountings by Defendants and Supplemental Complaint (Rec. 17-22) Filed September 12th, 1946.
In this pleading, plaintiff alleges that the accounts do not
comply with the Interlocutory Decree of the lower court
upheld by this court, for the reasons therein stated; sets up
that had the defendants been skilled in the operation of the
partnership equipment that they would have made in excess of the rental value thereof; that plaintiff was skilled in
the management of the business of said partnership, and
"by the fraudulent acts of the defendants he was deprived
of the management of said business, and of profits therefrom which would have exceeded the fair, actual and reasonable rental value of the equipment used in the operation
of the partnership business;" sets up the rental value of
all equipment used in the controversy, and the extent to
which the partnership of GRAHAM & STREET has been
damaged by the fraudulent taking of such equipment;
sets up the damage sustained by the fraudulent taking
of the business of the partnership of GRAHAM & STREET
as to profits to be derived after the conversion of such bus-

10
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iness; and prays that the accountings of defendants be rejected, that damages be allowed to the PARTNERSHIP OF
GRAHAM AND STREET in the amounts therein set forth;
that the partnership be dissolved after settlement of the
accounts; that in the terminating of the affairs of the partnership of Graham and Street, that the plaintiff be allowed
$5,000.00 as attorney's fees for maintaining and establishing the partnership; that after paying such attorney's fees
that the property of the partnership be distributed in accordance with the partnership agreement; that punitive damages be assessed; that costs be recovered by plaintiff; and
that general relief be granted to plaintiff.

Motions to strike and demurrers were filed by each defendant separately, (Rec. 23-43) and upon the overruling
of these motions and demurrers, the defendants f:Ied original
mandamus proceedings in this court, being case No. 7045
herein, the remittitur in said case being dated April 19th,
1948, (Rec. 451-455) in which this court, as the further
law of the case, stated:
Up to the time of the entry of the interlocutory decree the only issues which had been tr:ed were those
necessary to determine whether or not plaintiffs
were liable to Graham on any basis, i. e., whether
or not Graham was entitled to any relief of any kind
as against plaintiffs. The issues there involved were
whether or not a partnership ever existed betwee::-1
Graham and Street; whether or not such partnership
had ever been terminated, and if so, when; whether
or not Siegel was a proper party defendant in that
action; and certain procedural questions not ncccss11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ary to be noticed here. Evidence as to partnership
profits, and as to other similar matters was carefully
excluded. It was apparently the purpose of defendant court, and of the parties to that action, to determine first whether or not Graham was entitled to
any relief against plaintiffs. If it should be found
that a partnership existed, and that plaintiffs had
been guilty of the wrong-doing alleged by Graham,
then a second trial or inquiry should be had for the
purpose of determining the relief to which Graham
should be entitled. When we entertained the appeal
from the interlocutory decree we had before us only
those matters which had been litigated by defendant
court. The question of what relief Graham was entitled to was not before us. Any expressions of opinion by us as to what relief Graham was entitled to
were mere dicta-not the law of the case and not
binding either upon us or upon defendant court.
By the terms of the interlocutory decree affirmed by
us, defendant court retained jurisdiction of the case
to settle all accounts between the parties, to dissolve
the partnership and to make such further orders,
judgments, and decrees as might be just and equitable. We affirmed the decree unconditionally, and
without modification.
How then can it be argued that by our decree of
affirmance we foreclosed the defendant court from
entertaining any amendments to the pleading necessary to bring about an equitable result? By affirming the order requiring plaintiffs to account for the
profits and partnership assets, we did not thereby
preclude the court from making a supplementary
order requiring an account on a different basis, if it
should deem such necessary to accomplish an equitable result. By our decree of affirmance we said in
substance to the defendant court: "We have exam-
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ined into all of the issues thus far determined by you,
and find that you have decided them all correctly.
There has been no error thus far. You may proceed."
We did not tell the court in what manner it should
proceed. We did not lay down a course to follow.
We merely remitted the cause to defendant court to
be disposed of in accordance with the principles of
equity jurisprudence. By refusing to grant plaintiff's motion to strike, the defendant court violated
neither the letter nor the spirit of our mandate."
(Rec. 454). (191 P 2d. 153).
After the return of the remittitur in said action No.
7045 in this supreme court, the defendants each filed answers to the objections to accounting and supplemental
complaint (Rec. 44-68).
To the answers last above set forth, the plaintiff filed
motions to strike and demurrers, which were denied and
overruled in part and partly granted and sustained. (Rec.
69-74.)
Plaintiff filed replies to the answers to the supplemental complaints (Rec. 74-78).
Issues were joined on the pleadings thus filed and the
court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree (Rec. 115-122.)
It is from these latter Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law and Decree that both plaintiff and defendants have
appealed.
Plaintiff will refer to the facts as he makes his argument in this brief. Suffice it to say now that the plaintiff
13
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objects to the statements of fact made by each of the
defendants and especially calls attention to one false statement of fact in the brief of Max Siegel, at the bottom of
page 10 and the top of page 11 of his brief. Speaking of
the partnership equipment (Rec. 82, par. 4; Rec. 89, par. 2)
this statement is made: "It was sold January 12, 1945, by
MR. STREET, before he joined the Navy, for the agreed
price of $4,500.00, and this amount charged to Mr. Siegel in
the account (54)". Finding 11 of the original findings,
(Rec. 86) is the law of the case that MAX SIEGEL sold this
equipment to Roberts and Ferguson.
In examining both of the briefs of defendants herein,
they base their entire arguments on the premise that this
action is for a partnership accounting, and that the only
measure of account is an accounting in the settlement of
the partnership affairs and that nothing else is to be done.
If this premise falls, and is contrary to the law of the
case, a portion of which is above quoted, their whole argument falls with it and their briefs are sham, redundant, and
of no value whatsoever in presenting to this court the true
situation upon which the accounting should be based.

It is to be noted further, that the trial court based its

judgment on the statement in the memorandum decision
(Rec. 475-488) upon the premise that "the use of the partnership assets, and the conduct of the partnership business,
were carried on by Street assisted by Siegel, with reasonable
diligence, with one exception." Fashioning the findings and
14
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decree (Rec. 115-122) around this holding, the court proceeded with a so-called partnership accounting, and by so
doing did not follow the law of the case, nor the mandate
of this supreme court in the appeal from the interlocutory
decree (Rec. 438-442) and the mandamus proceedings heretofore had herein (Rec. 452-454).
POINTS RELIED UPON
I.
The district court failed to follow the law of the case
established by the supreme court in the appeal from the
interlocutory decree heretofore entered herein.
A. The contention of defendants and the findings of
the court that the action was for a partnership accounting
only is contrary to the law of the case.
B. The purported accountings filed by the defendants
were not in accordance with the interlocutory decree on
file herein, and are contrary to the law of the case, inasmuch as the defendant, Max Siegel, was not a partner in
the partnership of Graham and Street and is not entitled
to defend and account in this action as a partner, and for
the further reason that both defendants in their original
answers and in the first trial herein repudiated the ex'stence of a partnership and are now estopped from asking relief on the basis of a partnership agreement which they
both denied was ever made, as the only basis of settlement
herein.
15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n.
The proper measure of accounting in this action is
judgment for the value of the equipment taken at the time
of the taking, for damages for the value of the use thereof,
for the value of the contracts of the partnership appropriated by Siegel to his own use, for damages for disrupting the
partnership business, and for exemplary damages.
A. The proper measure of accounting in this action
for the unlawful taking of the equipment by Siegel is the
value of the equipment taken at the time of taking.
B. The proper measure of accounting in this action for
the detention of the equipment by the defendant, Siegel, is
the rental value thereof while so detained by Siegel.
C. The proper measure of accounting in this action for
the fraudulent appropriation of the partnership contracts
by Siegel to his own use is the total receipts received by
him on these contracts.
D. The defendants should account to the partnership
for damages caused for disrupting the partnership business.
E. The partnership should be allowed exemplary damages for the fraud of the defendants.

m.
It was error for the lower court to allow Max Siegel
rental value for the conveyor-loader.
IV.

The plaintiff proved all of the allegations of his supple-
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mental complaint and should have been awarded judgment
in accordance therewith.

v.
The lower court failed to follow the mandate of the supreme court in the appeal from the Interlocutory Decree
heretofore entered herein that the defendants should not be
allowed to profit from their own wrong.
VI.

The judgement entered on July 12th, 1952, herein does
not make the plaintiff, Graham, whole.
ARGUMENT

We now come to the argument in this case and as the
first point stated in "PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF
POINTS," (Rec. 500-501) the following is set forth:
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
LAW OF THE CASE ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE APPEAL FROM THE INTERLOCUTORY
DECREE HERETOFORE ENTERED HEREIN.
A

THE CONTENTION OF DEFENDANTS AND THE
FINDINGS OF THE COURT THAT THE ACTION WAS
FOR A PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING ONLY IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THE CASE.
It is interesting to note that the defendants in their
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brief on the original appeal from the Interlocutory Decree,
used as their first argument the following:
"THE AMENDED COMPLAINT INTRODUCED A
NEW CAUSE OF ACTION OTHER THAN AND
DIFFERENT FROM THE ORIGINAL CAUSE OF
ACTION." (Brief, page 6.)
Going on to argue this premise, on pages 7 and 8, the
brief states:
Section 104-14-3, U. C. A. 1943 permits amendments
to pleadings. But a new or different cause of action
may not be alleged under the guise of an amendment.
:1(:

***

The original cause of action was an equitable
action by one partner seeking an account for partnership moneys and property received by the other
partner. The amended complaint sought to add to
this as against the defendant Street another cause of
action for damages for conspiring to take over the
partnership assets. And in addition, against the defendant Siegel for damages for such a conspiracy,
and also to adjudicate as against the defendant Street
(this should be Siegel) that a contract of purchase
which he had made with Bothwell Construction Company was in fact a loan to the alleged partnership.
The defendants could not have stated the purpose of
the amended complaint in a clearer fashion. They have
now reversed themselves and their whole contention in this
appeal is that there is only one theory of recovery in this
matter and that is for an accounting within the partnership.
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This supreme court in discussing the above argument
(Rec. 438) states:
While the original complaint contained a vague reference to a conspiracy between Street and third
parties as shown by the above italicized portion, the
new matter we think is more than a mere elaboration
of this vague charge of conspiracy because it definitely names Siegel as the outside conspiring party and
guiding genius of Street in his alleged departure from
the conduct expected from one related to another in
trust and confidence. The gravamen of the offense
is shifted from one in the original complaint of a
recalcitrant partner who will not account and who,
with the assistance of others, uses partnership property for other than partnership use, to one where
the material part of the offense is the defrauding of
Graham by the connivance of Street and Siegel in
which the partnership of Graham and Street is a preliminary issue. (Rec. 438, pages 1 and 2 of opinion.)
The second argument used by defendants in their
ort the first appeal was:

br~ef

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO JOIN
SIEGEL AS A PARTY DEFENDANT.
In discussing this matter, this supreme court, on pages
2 and 3 of its opinion (Rec. 438-439) states:
We think the amended complaint, when the history
of the transactions somewhat narratively stated is
considered, sets forth an action in equity, the, very
core of which is the fraudulent action of the defendants Street and Siegel in conniving to undo a partnership between Graham and Street and to keep from
Graham the property and fruits of his alleged part-
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nership with Street. The allegations of plaintiff's
partnership with Street are necessary and preliminary to arrive at the part that Siegel and Street played
in disrupting the relationship of Graham and Street.
Even if the amended complaint be thought of as
embracing two causes of action, one to declare the
existence of a partnership between Graham and
Street and for an accounting by Street in respect
to that partnership, and the other sounding in fraud
to determine the legal and equitable status of the
"cat" and to make Siegel account for his alleged
participation in wrongfully diverting and withholding
the property and earnings of the Graham-Street partnership, the two are so bound and interrelated that
it would seem difficult to separate them. If it were
possible to separate them and Graham had brought
one action against Street and another action contemporaneously against Street and Siegel, the court, in
the interest of practicable and economic procedure,
would have had to consolidate them if indeed they
may not have been considered as brought under Sec.
104-7-3, subd. 1, U.C.A. 1943, even though not separately stated. For the very reason that the successive
transactions are so related and so blended into each
other that they form one whole and complete episode,
such separation would be difficult to accomplish. It
is natural and logical to conceive of the complaint
as constructed about the central transactions whereby Siegel allegedly insinuated himself in the Graham
and Street relationship and look at the other allegations as matters leading up to or away from the
central scheme. It is not required that a series of
transactions so closely related in time and fact as to
produce a substantial cause and effect transition be
grouped and compartmentalized so as to fall into
designated types of legal actions. The law serves life.
Reformed pleading unlike that of common law is not
a straight-jacket which allows of no freedom of
20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l

movement. Life and the books are replete with
cases where the alleged wrong emanates or evolves
from a series of related transactions in which various
actors have played varying parts with varying degrees of guilt or delict. The wrong chosen from the
whole of the facts as a basis for the action is nonetheless so because a separation and grouping of some
of the transactions along the way may disclose other
lesser or incidental wrongs which could themselves
have been made the basis of causes of action of a conventional type. In this situation neither of the defendants may require the plaintiff to split the pattern
of this cases into fragments to be tried as separate
actions against separate defendants upon raising the
cry of misjoinder of causes of action and of defendants. (Cases quoted.)

fuc

rull

*** **
The fraud consists in Siegel using his title as a lever
to exact more from Graham than the interest agreed
upon and that for such purpose he either took the
title with a secret intention of so doing, or, after
taking title for security purposes only, later conceived
of the scheme to use it for such excess exaction, and
not succeeding in getting Graham to agree to a modification of what was a loan agreement he then used
his title in connivance with Street to divert what was
in reality Graham-Street equipment charged with a
loan from that partnership, TO HIS OWN PURPOSE.
(emphasis ours).

llc

I

:1:,

** **

Plaintiff wishes to particularly emphasize this next
quotation from the same argument:
This is an action in equity to have declared by decree
the partnership between Graham and Street; to have
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the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself as
owner declared as fraudulant; and to make Siegel
account FOR THE PROPERTY OR THE PROCEEDS THEREOF as Graham-Street partnership
property and for an accounting AS TO PROFITS
therefrom while it was controlled by Siegel conniving
with the allegedly faithless Street.
(Page 4 of opinion, Rec. 439.)
It is to be noted here, that in their answers, both defendants denied that any partnership ever existed, (Rec.
394 and Rec. 404-407.) It was necessary to determine first
that there was a partnership, what the partnership owned,
and the status of the parties before any action for the recovery of the property of the partnership could be commenced.
Between the time of the filing of the original complaint on
May 13th, 1944, (Rec. 389-391) and the filing of the amended complaint on April 17th, 1945 (Rec. 396-403) Siegel had
sold the partnership equipment as his own equipment on
January 12th, 1945 (Rec. 86). In his original brief, the
defendant Siegel makes this pertinent statement on page 18:

But Siegel did not sell partnership equipment.
sold his equipment.

He

The lower court and this supreme court on appeal found
that there was a partnership which owned certain assets,
which included the following:
In order to show that Graham's interest in the alleged partnership was at best nominal, it is strenuously
urged that Graham only contributed $15.00 to the
venture. He had, however, arranged with the Both22
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well Construction Company for a purchase of the
equipment. Granting to Street the right to share
in that purchase was a contribution. His firm of
Clyde, Probst and Graham had the entree to jobs.
They relinquished in favor of Graham. Certainly a
partnership may be formed between two men to
operate equipment which they both own, although
mortgaged for the full purchase price. The equity
in the machine if any and the contract to excavate
which will yield returns whether the contract is express, implied or for pay by the unit, is the partnership capital. (Rec. 440).

WI

This supreme court further found that the partnership owned the following asset:
That about August 26th Graham and Street went
down to look over another job of excavating for Garf
and Nelson and obtained a contract.
This supreme court, as above set forth, shows that
Siegel should account for the partnership property or the
proceeds thereof and for an accounting as to the profits
therefrom while it was controlled by Siegel conniving with
the allegedly faithless Street. s~jd accmmting was to be
made t:-> the partnership. (Emphasis ours).
As to Street's liability, this court said on page 9 of its
opinion (Rec. 442):
In this case Street used property belonging to the
partnership, treating it as belonging to Siegel, refusing to account to Graham for the moneys collected
for the use of the tractor, but the property will in
equity be considered as being used for the benefit
of the Graham-Street partnership and accounting of
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profits required to be made to this partnership.
In passing, it should be noted that the word "profits"
is not used in the entire Interloculory Decree. In its opinion
in the mandamus proceeding (Rec. 454) this court held as
the law of the case:
When we entertained the appeal from the interlocutory decree we had before us only those matters
which had been litigated by defendant court. The
question of what relief Graham was entitled to was
not before us. Any expressions of opinion by us as
to what relief Graham was entitled to were mere
dicta-not the law of the case and not binding either
upon us or upon defendant court.
Plaintiff therefore argues that the word "profits"
should have been stricken from the top of page 10 of its
opinion (Rec. 442) as well as the words "or of the rental
value, whichever may be the greater." The statement
should then read "Equity will nevertheless treat the partnership as existing and require an accounting."
This supreme court in its opinion (Page 4, Rec. 439)
sets the nature of the cause of action against Siegel as being
one to make him account "for the partnership property or
the proceeds thereof as Graham-Street partnership property''.
Section 104-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides:
In an action to recover the possesion of personal property, judgment for the plaintiff may be for the
24
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possession, OR THE VALUE THEREOF IN CASE
A DELIVERY CANNOT BE HAD, and damages for
the detention. (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of Wasatch Oil Refining Company v. Wade,
92 Utah, 50, 63 P. 2 1070, this court said:
Where a case is brought in equity, and the proved
facts support the allegations of the complaint entitling plaintiff to equitable relief, the court having
obtained juristdiction over the cause will, in the
execise of its equity jurisdiction, proceed to decide
the whole issues and award complete relief, although
the rights of the parties may be strictly legal. That
is to say, damages will be awarded in substitution
for or in addition to equitable relief.
While the action for possession, or the value thereof in
case a delivery cannot be had, and damages for the detention, is an action at law, it may b2 settled in this action based
upon the ruling above quoted.
In the case of Kunz v. Nelson, et al., 94 U. 185, 76 P.2d
577, 115 A. L. R. 1322, in .a case for possession of personality
and damages for its retention, Mr. Just:ce Wolfe discusses
this class of cases. It states at page 583 of the Pacific Reporter:
A moment's reflection and a glance at the statutes
on claim and delivery, Rev. St. 1933, 104-16-1 et seq.,
will reveal that claim and delivery is only ancillary
to an action for possess:on in order to retain or
obtain possession pending the trying out of the
rights by the court. While the use of the mechanism of claim and delivery would, if properly ancillary,
stamp the action as one of replevin and not of con25
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version, the absence of such use cannot stamp a
possessory action as one for conversion. This action
must be treated as for possession and not for conversion.
In the instant case the judgment should have been
in the alternative unless it appeared that the hay
and grain could not be returned or could not be
returned in substantially the same condition and
plaintiff was willing to waive possession, in which
case a judgment for the value only, together with
interest (use of rental value instead of interest in
cases where the articles were not trade commodities
but had particular use of the prevailing part, such
as workmen's tools), would have been permissible.
This case is an able discussion of the rules regarding
possessory actions, and stamps the instant case as set forth
by the pleadings in the original and amended complaints
(Rec. 390-303 and 396-403) insofar as it pertains to Siegel,
as one for possession of the partnership equipment and
other assets, in favor of the partnership of Graham and
Street.
The case of Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah, 186, 189 P.
873, is a case directly in point on the liability of Siegel.
Said case holds as follows:
If the value of the use of the automobile constitutes

special damages, the allegation in the complaint as
to damages is clearly insufficient. Special damages
must be pleaded. It is expressly provided by Comp.
Laws of Utah 1917, No. 6864, that"In an action to recover the possession of personal
property, judgment for the plaintiff may be for the
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possession or the value thereof, in case a delivery
cannot be had, and damages for the detention. If
the property has been delivered to the plaintiff, and
the defendant claims a return thereof, judgment for
the defendant may be for a return of the property,
or the value thereof, in case a return cannot be had,
and damages for taking and withholding the same."
In ·this case the evidence shows that appellant had
sold the automobile, and respondent was therefore
entitled to a judgment for the value of the property,
"not as damages for the conversion, but as a substitute for and in lieu of the property," and was "in
addition * * * * entitled to a judgment for damages
for the taking and withholding" the property. Nahas
v. Browning (Cal.) 183 Pac. 442.
And the damages were general, not special. They
were such damages as necessarily result from taking
and detaining property, and need, therefore, not be
specially pleaded. In Farrand & Votey v. M. E.
Church, 18 Utah, at page 34, 54 Pac. at page 819, the
court, quoting from 3 Suth. Damages, No. 1144,
said:
"Without alleging special injury the plaintiff may
recover in replevin such damages for the detention
of the property as the jury, upon all the evidence,
may be satisfied that its use, considering its nature
and character, was worth during the time of the
detention.''

,.,
'··

It is insisted by appellant that when the value of the

property is fixed at the time of taking, the loss of use
should be compensation by allowing the successful
party in a replevin suit to recover interest on the
value of the property from the time of taking. Many
authorities upholding that contention are cited by
appellant's counsel. So far as this jurisdiction is con27
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cerned, the question is settled in Farrand & Votey v.
M. E. Church, supra, in which the rule stated in 3
Suth. Damages, No. 1144, is adopted, as follows:
"Interest on the value will not be adequate compensation, and is not the measure of damages where
the use of the property detained is valuable. The
owner is entitled to recover the value of the use if
he prefers it to interest during the time he was deprived of possession."
The court then says:
"We are of the opinion that it was not error to allow
the plaintiff the value of the use of the property
during its unlawful detention, instead of interest
on its value."
If the value of the use of an article exceeds the in-

terest, it is fair and just that the one deprived of
his property should be paid what the use was reasonably worth. This seems to us the better rule.
The rule as above quoted is held to be the rule in Kunz
v. Nelson, et al., supra.
The Supplemental Complaint set up the measure of
damage for the unlawful and fraudulent detention of the
assets of the partnership. (Rec. 17-22). It also set up the
damages for the disruption of the partnership business.
This was done by the plaintiff to ask for such rental value
as a substitute for interest or profits or any other compensation for the wrongful detention of the property. At the
time of the trial, Siegel was still unlawfully detaining this
property. He held the legal title under the conditional sale
28
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contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit I) with Roberts and Ferguson.
This contract was still in existence at the time of the trial
(Rec. 324.)
Inasmuch as this supreme court has required Siegel to
account for the property or the proceeds thereof as GrahamStreet partnership property, the lower court should have

~

required such an accounting. In fact the only way in which
the lower court required Siegel to respond was for damages

uo

~u

for (1) excluding Graham from the partnership and (2)

n11

ptmitive damages. It was error for the lower court to refuse to require Siegel to account for rental value, such refusal being contrary to the law of the case.
B

THE PURPORTED ACCOUNTINGS FILED BY THE
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE ON FILE HEREIN,
AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THE CASE,
INASMUCH AS THE DEFENDANT, MAX SIEGEL, WAS
NOT A PARTNER IN THE PARTNERSHIP OF GRAHAM
AND STREET AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO DEFEND
AND ACCOUNT IN TillS ACTION AS A PARTNER,
AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT BOTH DEFENDANTS IN THEIR ORIGINAL ANSWERS AND IN
THE FIRST TRIAL HEREIN REPUDIATED THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP AND ARE NOW
ESTOPPED FROM ASKING FOR RELIEF ON THE
BASIS OF A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WHICH
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THEY BOTH DENIED WAS EVER MADE, AS THE ONLY
BASIS OF SETTLEMENT HEREIN.
Siegel mas not a member of the partnership.
The whole fiction of the defendants in their answers
to the supplemental complaint which appear in the record at
pages 44 to 68, is that they are accounting for the operations of the partnership assets and business, and that said
business was carried on as originally intended by the partners.
Siegel states his case (Rec. 46) as follows:
"That the equipment involved or belonging to the
said partnership was, during the entire operation of
said partnership business, used and operated therein,
and the earnings therefrom received, as, and in
the manner, contemplated and intended by the parties."
Street states his case (Rec. 60) as follows:
"The equipment involved or belonging to the said
partnership was, during the entire portion of said
partnership business, used and operated therein and
the earnings therefrom received as and in the manner
contemplated and intended by the parties when they
undertook to form a partnership."
To these answers, the plaintiff filed motions to strike
and demurrers which should have been granted and sustained for the reasons therein set forth and hereinafter shown.
It was error for the court not to grant the motions and
sustain the demurrers.
In the original mandamus proceedings in this supreme
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court, numbered No. 7045, wherein the defendants sought
to force the lower court to enter the judgment they desired
which they stated should be as follows:
"That the Supreme Court in its opm10n (166 Pac.
(2) 524), its remand, and in its opinion and ruling
on rehearing, clearly indicated and required that the
said District Court should proceed to follow out the
original decree of the Court, i. e., should proceed to
_settle the accounting of the partners (including Siegel as a constructive partner in equity so that he
might not profit from his wrong) , and should, consequently, as the decree provided, require defendants
to account for the monies received from the operation of the partnership assets since August 6, 1943,
to the date of the decree, and to account for any
capital assets not sold and retained by defendants
less costs of equipment purchased, loans paid, and
operating expenses, and should thereupon, dissolve
the partnership by decree of Court."
This supreme court refused to make the temporary
writ of mandamus permanent, (Rec. 452-455.) It held that
the measure and extent of the damages or judgment to be
entered was not before the trial court or the supreme court
on the appeal.
The lower court in his memorandum declsion (Rec.
475) based his decision on this premise:
"A test of the record, in the Court's judgment, justified the finding that from August 6, 1943 and up to
December 26, 1944, the use of the partnership assets,
and the conduct of the partnership business, were
carried on by Street asslsted by Siegel, with reasonable diligence, with one exception."
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The "accountings" of the defendants were based upon
the following transactions, as recorded on pages 11 and
12 of BRIEF OF APPELLANT, MAX SIEGEL:
The accounts from which the accounting were made
by defendants were kept in a book, Exhibit "N", by
Mr. Street and his wife (173). The receipts were entered there along with the records of the jobs he was
employed on, and of his time. Expenses, except some
out-of-pocket payments (160) paid by him, were
also entered in this book. Except for such small expense payments, all receipts were turned over to
Mr. Siegel who receipted in the book (193), Exhibit
"N", for them, and all the payments of bills and invoices were first checked by Mr. Street (193) and
paid by the check of Siegel on the "special account"
kept for this operation. The defendants checked up
on each other, for their own protection (193), and
agreed on the payments to be made out of the account (177). Their respective accounts on the whole
operation reconciled with each other within $25.20
(6,53,175).
In sustaining the defendants in their contention for this
spurious accounting method, the lower court entirely ignored the replies of the plaintiff to the answers of the defendants found at pages 74 to 78, and pages 110 to 113 of
the record. These replies were necessary to counteract the
allegations in the answers of the defendants which should
have been stricken. They do help to clarify the issues and
should have been regarded by the lower court. Nearly all
of the allegations are repetitious of matters which are the
law of the case, and are rather lengthy. They are not
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quoted here but show the contentions of the plaintiff relative to the spurious accountings made by the defendants,
upon the basis above set forth. By their accountings, they
are trying to render null and void the rulings of this supreme
court as to their fraud, and to avoid the consequences of
the wrongful taking and detaining of the partnership assets
and business, and withholding it from partnership purposes,
and appropriating it to their own use. By making the accounts on the basis alleged, the defendants admit that they
do not intend to account for their fraud, nor for the
taking and detaining of the partnership assets and business
by the fraudulent methods which they used.
Plaintiff cannot find any basis of law or fact in the
record to sustain this impossible situation. Before such a
condition could exist the following statements must be
answered by law and fact:
How could Siegel insert himself into a partnership on
August 6th, 1943 when he claimed in his anwer (Rec. 404)
that the partnership agreement "was not executed or completed?"
How could Graham be excluded from a partnership
which the defendants in their answers said never existed?
(Rec. 392 and 404).
How could Street operate equipment belonging to the
partnership and for its benefit when he claimed in his original pleadings and at the first trial that there was no partnership, that the equipment belonged to Siegel, and that he
33
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was renting this equipment from Siegel?
How can the defendants and the lower court say that
"On September 3, 1946, the said defendants severally filed
accounts purporting to set forth the items of account ordered by this Court, which accounting correctly reflects all
of the receipts to the partnership Graham and Street during the period between August 6, 1943 and December 26,
1944, which dates represent the date when the said partnership was formed (August 6, 1943) and the date when
the defendant Street ceased to operate the equipment for
the purposes originally designed for the partnership (December 26, 1944)", as set forth in Finding 2, (Rec. 115-116),
when the record shows that all receipts were turned over
to Max Siegel, who was not a partner, and were not credited
to the partnership account in a bank as required by the
Law of the Case (Finding 5, Rec. 82), and especially when
both defendants claimed there was no partnership, no partnership bank account, and that the monies belonged to the
defendants as the owner and lessee of the equipment?
How can the defendants and the lower court say that
the accounts of defendants "correctly reflects all of the expenditures" of the partnership when the Law of the Case
(Finding 5, Rec. 82) shows that the "checks drawn on funds
belonging to said partnership were to be signed by both
partners", and the checks were actually signed by Siegel
who was not a partner (Brief of Appellant, Max Siegel,
page 12)?
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And finally, how can there be any accounting within
the partnership of Graham and Street when that partnership has been deprived of its assets and business by the
fraudulent acts of the defendants, has no money in the bank
and no winding up of its affairs can be had?
How can the defendants blow both hot and· cold?
Before the first trial, the pleadings of both defendants
showed that they relied entirely on their allegations that
there was no partnership ever formed, that Siegel purchased the equipment involved as his own property, operated
it as the owner, received all of the monies from the operation, and paid all of the bills in the position of an owner.
There was no pleading that they were operating the equipment and collecting the proceeds thereof and paying the
expenditures as partners, and no pleading that they were
operating the partnership equipment and business as originally intended by the partners. The contrary appears.
When the lower court decided these issues and they were
affirmed by this supreme court on appeal, these matters
became res adjudicata, the law of the case, and cannot be
changed.

The lower court is without jurisdiction to alter

this, Silva v. Pickard, supra.
By their answers to the supplemental complaint shown
at pages 44 to 58 of the record, the <;Jefendants completely
reversed themselves and endeavored to litigate matters
which had already been decided.

They now admitted the
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partnership, and in effect sought to have adjudicated a
contrary defense to their original defense, to the effect that
Siegel had inserted himself as a partner and kicked Graham
out of the partnership, and that Street ran the partnership
equipment with the assistance of partner Siegel, and all of
the purposes of the partnership were thus fully carried out,
and that an accounting should be held between Siegel and
Street of their operations of the equipment and business as
the operations of the Graham and Street partnership, and
that this accounting of their nefarious operations should be
shoved down the throat of Graham as a complete winding
up of the affairs of the partnership.
To the answers referred to~ the plaintiff filed motions to
strike and demurrers, (Rec. 69-73). The motions, among
other things, alleged that the answers set up matters contrary to the law of the case as determined in the former
proceedings before this supreme court. The demurrers each
set up "that all allegations of defense and counterclaim
therein are res adjudicata." The lower court struck portions of the answers but left in the answers the allegations
which gave rise to all of the confusion in the lower court.
It was error for the court to allow these answers at all.

The court then allowed the defendants to reverse themselves and after defending originally on the basis that there
was no partnership, to now defend on the ground that there
was a partnership and they were operating it all of the time.
The findings and decree here appealed from were entered
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on this new theory.
This supreme court in the remittitur in the appeal on
the interlocutory decree, (Rec. 439, page 4, next to last
paragraph), states:
This is an action in equity to have declared by decree
the partnership between Graham and Street; to
have the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself
as owner declared as fraudulent; and to make
SIEGEL account for that property or the proceeds
thereof as Graham-Street partnership property and
for an account as to profits therefrom while it was
controlled by SIEGEL conniving with the allegedly
faithless Street. (Emphasis ours).
This accounting has nothing to do with Street,. as we
understand it. The accounting is to be made to the partnership of Graham and Street and not to Graham individually.
Siegel cannot account to Graham individually for GrahamStreet property and surely cannot, under the above ruling,
account as a partner.
At the bottom of page 9, (Rec. 442) this supreme court

fer

says:
In this case STREET used property belonging to the
partnership, treating it as belonging to Siegel, refusing to account to Graham for the moneys collected
for the use of the tractor, but the property will in
equity be considered as being used for the benefit of
the Graham-Street partnership and accounting of
profits required to be made TO THIS PARTNERSHIP. (Emphasis ours).
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Section 69-1-18. Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides:
Every partner must account to the partnership for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits,
derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership
or from any use by him of its property.
The accountings were to be made to the partnership of
Graham and Street. They were made not to said partnership, but were made as accountings within the partnership
for the purpose of winding up its affairs. This is untenable.
The allegation of paragraph 8 of the supplemental complaint (Rec. 19) "That the defendants and each of them,
for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 hereinabove,
have failed and refused to account to this court as ordered
in the interlocutory decree on file herein, and plaintiff alleges that they do not intend to do so," must be taken as
true in the light of the pleadings and arguments of the defendants.
In summing this part of the argument up, there can be
no equitable holding that the contentions of the defendants
are true. Max Siegel was not a partner in the partnership
of Graham and Street and is not entitled to defend and account in this action as a partner. Both of the defendants
are estopped from asking for relief on the basis of a partnership agreement which they both denied was ever made,
as the only basis of settlement herein.
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POINT II.
THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING IN
THIS ACTION IS JUDGMENT FOR THE VALUE OF THE
EQUIPMENT TAKEN AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING,
FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE USE THEREOF, FOR THE VALUE OF THE CONTRACTS OF THE
PARTNERSIDP APPROPRIATED BY SIEGEL TO HIS
OWN USE, FOR DAMAGES FOR DISRUPTING THE
PARTNERSIDP BUSINESS, AND FOR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES.

In their brief on the first appeal on the interlocutory
decree, the defendants set forth the following: (Brief page
8)
The original cause of action was an equitable action
by one partner seeking an accounting for the partnership moneys and property received by the other
partner. The amended complaint sought to add to
this as against the defendant Street another cause
of action for damages for conspiring to take over
the partnership assets. And in addition, against the
defendant Siegel for damages for such a conspiracy,
and also to adjudicate as against the defendant Siegel
that a contract of purchase which he made with
Bothwell Construction Company was in fact a contract of a loan to the alleged partnership. We do
not believe that these matters are all set out in the
amended complaint, but if we read the court's ruling
correctly, they are matters upon which the court
has ruled.
The defendants cannot say that they were not warned
that the plaintiff was asking for an accounting for the re-
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turn of the partnership assets and damages for such wrongful taking. The above statement was made by defendants
before the supplemental complaint (Rec. 17-22) was filed.
Finding 11 of the original findings (Rec. 86) which is
the law of the case, reads as follows:
11. That from and since August 23rd, 1943, the defendants have conspired to take possession of the
partnership property of Graham and Street, to collect
and misappropriate the funds earned in the operation
of the equipment ON THE CONTRACTS OF GRAHAM & STREET, and to exclude plaintiff from any
management or control of said partnership business,
and have continued to operate the said partnership
business, and have continued to operate the said
partnership equipment and business until January
12th, 1945, collect all moneys from the operation
thereof and apropriate said moneys to their own use;
that on or about the 12th day of January, 1945, the
said defendant, Max Siegel, with the consent of the
defendant, Evan E. Street, but without the consent
or knowledge of the plaintiff, sold all of the partnership equipment hereinabove set forth to Roberts &
Ferguson of Utah County, Utah, for the sum of Six
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars $$6,500.00). (Emphasis ours) .
Finding 14 (Rec. 87) reads as follows:
That plaintiff has never relinquished any interest in
the partnership of Graham & Street, nor the property belonging to said partnership, hereinabove set
forth, and said partnership has never been dissolved
but is now an existing partnership between the said
Arthur Graham and Evan E. Street.
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Finding 15 (Rec. 87) reads as follows:
That the note set forth in paragraph 6 above has
not been paid, and the mortgage set forth in said
paragraph 6 has never be~n foreclosed.
Finding 16 (Rec. 87) reads in part:
That by a sale of the said partnership property, defendants have deprived the partnership of the reasonable earnings of the partnership property.
As set forth above in subdivision B of Point I, the defendants did not file any accountings TO the partnership of
Graham and Street, but filed accountings reflecting their
dealings between Siegel and Street, padding such accounts
full of charges for services and expenses of Max Siegel
and rental due him on equipment which was not leased to
the partnership, and claimed these accounts were made
WITHIN the partnership of Graham and Street and were
accountings within that partnership. (Rec. 6-16).

nol'

AC

The supplemental complaint (Rec. 17-22) set forth the
spurious nature of the accounts submitted and asked that
the defendants respond for the rental value alleged in the
supplemental complaint TO THE PARTNERSHIP OF
GRAHAM & STREET.

!. ~

No new theories were introduced in said supplemental
complaint which endeavored to change any matter that was
res adjudicata. The measure and extent of the recovery
which Graham should have was not before the lower court
nor considered on the appeal (Rec. 454). This supplemental
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complaint was made to set up the measure and extent of
the recovery which Graham should have in the premises.
This supreme court on the first appeal (Rec. back of
page 439) held as follows:
This is an action in equity to have declared by decree
the partnership between Graham and Street; to have
the alleged conduct of Siegel treating himself as
owner declared as fraudulent; and to make Siegel
account for that property or the proceeds thereof as
Graham-Street partnership property and for an accounting as to profits therefrom while it was controlled by Siegel conniving with the allegedly faithless Street.
A discussion of the various measures of damage will
now be discussed:
A

THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING IN THIS
ACTION FOR THE UNLAWFUL TAKING OF THE
EQUIPMENT BY SIEGEL IS THE VALUE OF THE
EQUIPMENT TAKEN AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING.
As shown in the argument under subdivision A of Point
I, Section 104-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,

provid~s

the measure in this case.
Finding 8 of the findings of fact (Rec. 117) finds the
value of the equipment sold by the defendant, Siegel, to be
$4,500.00. Plaintiff accepts this value.
42
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B

THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTT.NG IN
THIS ACTION FOR THE DETENTION OF THE EQUIPMENT BY THE DEFENDANT, SIEGEL, IS THE RENTAL
VALUE THEREOF WHILE SO DETAINED BY SIEGEL.
This is the point most objected to by the defendants.
Neither defendant in his brief has questioned the finding 4
(Rec. 117) as to the rental value of the equipment wrongfully appropriated by Siegel to his own purposes. This is set
at $966 per month.
The rental value was based upon the expert testimony
of Walter W. Kershaw, vice president and general manager
of the Robinson-Kershaw Company, Caterpillar distributors
for this area. He testified that he knew the caterpillar involved in this action (Rec. 204), and testified as to rental
values of the equipment involved in this action from pages
204 to 259 of the record. It was based upon the fact that
the lessee had to pay all repairs, all costs of operation, and
return the equipment to the lessor in as good a condition as
when received. (Rec. 209). (Rec. 247). The rental value
would be the amount found by the court in said finding 4
from the time the equipment was purchased in 1943 until
the time of trial and in fact would bring more at this date
(Rec. 220). The practice of lessee's paying for the upkeep of the rented material is still in vogue (Rec. 428).
Very few tractors purchased prior to 1942 have been completely worn out and discarded (Rec. 249). The tractor in43
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volved in this action was in "normal or fair operating condition" on September 19, 1949 (Rec. 249).
No pleadings can be found in the answers of defendants
(Rec. 44-68) which allege that the partnership equipment
has depreciated or deteriorated in rental value or otherwise, and no allegations are made that an offer or tender of
the return of the equipment has been made.
In the case of Farrand & Votey Organ Co. v. Board of
Church Extension of Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Utah,
467, 18 Utah, 29, 54 Pac. 818, this court said:

We are of the opinion that it was not error to allow
plaintiff the value of the use of the property during
its unlawful detention, instead of interest on its
value.
In the case of Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah, 186 P. 837,

involving an automobile which had been sold during the
course of the proceedings, this court says:
So far as this jurisdiction is concerned, the question
is settled in Farrand & Votey v. M. E. Church, supra,
in which the rule stated in 3 Suth. Damages, No.
1144, is adopted, as follows:
"Interest on the value will not be adequate compensation, and is not the measure of damages where
the use of the property detained is valuable. The
owner is entitled to recover the value of the use if
he prefers it to interest during the time he was deprived of possession."
The court then says:
"We are of the opinion that it was not error to allow
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the plaintiff the value of the use of the property
during its unlawful detention, instead of interest on
its value."
If the value of the use of an article exceeds the in-

terest, it is fair and just that the one deprived of his
property should be paid what the use was reasonably
worth. This seems to us the better rule. Nahas v.
Browning, supra; (183 Pac. 442); Hammand v.
Thompson, 54 Mont. 609, 173 Pac. 229; Tannahill
v. Lydon, 31 Idaho, 608, 173 Pac. 1146; Tucker v.
Hagerty, 37 Cal. App. 789, 174 Pac. 908; Hunt v.
Cohen ( Okl.) 179 Pac. 1; Beck v. Lee, 172 Pac. 686.
In the case of Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 68 Utah,
30, 249 P. 121, this court said:

The court awarded respondent as damages the reasonable value of the use of the car during the time it
was wrongully withheld from him. All courts, so
far as we know, agree that the reasonable value of
th use of an automobile for the time it was wrongfully detained from the owner constitutes the legal
measure of damage. Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Cunningham (Ariz.) 238 P. 332; Cook v. Packard Motor
Car Co., 88 Conn. 592, 92 A. 413, L. R. A. 1915C, 319.
The case of Kunz v. Nelson, et al, supra, affirms the
holdings above made.
The rule then, in this state, is that rental value is substituted for interest for the time of the wrongful detention.
These damages are general and can be obtained under the
prayer for general relief, as follows:
And the damages were general, not special. They
were such damages as necessarily result from taking
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and detaining property, and need, therefore, not
be specially pleaded, Dolinsky v. Williams, supra.
Furthermore, in the last quoted case, the automobile
had been sold and could not be returned. The court allowed
rental value as damages up to the time of the trial.
In his memorandum decision (Rec. 475-487) the trial

court held that the Siegel-Street accounting was an accounting within the partnership of Graham and Street and in the
winding up of the affairs of the partnership in which Graham was entitled to $2,974.01 (Rec. 483). The Memorandum Decision then goes on:
However, on January 12, 1945, the defendants ceased
to hold the partnership property, but sold it, thus
placing it out of the reach of the plaintiff. In fact
and in law, the defendants converted the plaintiff's
interest in the partnership assets at the moment they
took exclusive control thereof and excluded the plaintiff therefrom. The plaintiff from that time was entitled to the market value of his interest therein, together with interest upon such value until the date
of payment to hjm. Having held that the princples
of equity, and the rights of the innocent partner, the
plaintiff herein, are best served by accounting as a
partnership until sale of the property, to allow plaintiff interest for the partnership period would be to
allow a double recovery to the plaintiff. Thus it is
ordered that the plaintiff have interest upon the sum
of $2,974.01 at the legal rate from the 12th day of
January, 1945 until paid.
As heretofore set forth several times, this supreme
court has held that this action is one for an accounting and
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that Siegel account for the partnership property or the
proceeds thereof as Graham-Street partnership property
(Rec. back of page 439). The action is not for conversion.

~1u

In Kunz v. Nelson, supra, this court said:
As to the question of whether the court was correct
after verdict in rendering a judgment for the value
only, the action being one for possession and not for
conversion. Originally the common law regarding
replevin was very strict. It did not permit of obtaining the value of the article withheld, even though it
transpired that the article had been destroyed and
could not be returned. This was softened by judicial
decision or changed by statute. Section 104-30-11,
R. S. Utah 1933, provides that, "in an action to recover the possession of personal property, judgment
for the plaintiff may be for the possession, or the
value thereof in case the delivery cannot be had, and
damages for the detention." (Italic added.) An action for possession cannot ordinarily be transmuted
into an action of conversion unless both parties treat
it as such. Even when only the value need be given
it is not because the nature of the action is changed,
but because by reason of the fact that the article
cannot be returned, value is substituted for the property. Dolinsky v. Williams, 56 Utah 186, 189 P.
873. This is because a claimant of property, sincerely believing it to be his, need not run the risk in
holding it, that he can be compelled to buy it from
the other in case it is found to be the property of
the other. 23 R. C. L. 904; Allen v. Fox, 1873, 51
N. Y. 562, 10 Am. Rep. 641; Dwight v. Enos, 9 N. Y.
470; Fitzhugh v. Wiman, 9 N. Y. 559.
It is the law of this case that there was no action for
conversion. The plaintiff's view that the partnership be
47
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allowed damages for the rental value of the equipment in
lieu of interest for the unlawful detention, is correct.
In requiring the accountings in the Interlocutory Decree, plaintiff does not at any point set up that he will accept
as correct these accountings, and in fact the word "profits"
does not appear in the entire decree. These accountings
were for information purposes only so that the court could
settle any accounts between the parties, and so that he
could make further orders, judgments and decrees to settle
all differences between and among the parties to end the
entire controversy existing on the subject matter of the
action.
· The court in his Memorandum Decision (Rec. 475) proceeds to accept the accounts between Siegel and Street as
correct on the theory that Siegel is a substituted party in the
partnership of Graham and Street, that Siegel account as
if he were the partner Graham, that Siegel be allowed all
of his claims for rental and other things for new equipment
which he purchased with his own funds but were used in
partnership business by the partner Siegel and the partner
Street, and that Siegel could unjustly enrich himself by
showing that the partner Siegel leased this independent
property from non-partner Siegel and then transferred this
burden upon excluded partner Graham, and without any
fraudulent showing Siegel could force upon Graham as binding upon Graham all of the items of expense including the
rental of the conveyor-loader, and after Siegel had so compensated himself, that the accounting of these expenses be
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considered Graham's acts and that he would be compelled
to accept partner Siegel's accounting in a partnership which
Siegel claimed and claims never existed, even though Graham gave no consent or assent to any such substitution.
The lower court then proceeds to substitute this accounting
by partner Siegel for interest during the time Siegel claimed
he was the owner and no partnership existed from August
6th, 1943, to January 12th, 1945, when Siegel sold the equipment. The lower court then proceeded to terminate and
wind up the affairs of the partnership on January 12th,
1945, even though he had in the Interlocutory Decree decreed that the partnership existed on June 15th, 1945. There
is nothing in the record to show any attempt to dissolve the
partnership before the entry of the Memorandum Decision
on May 24th, 1951 (Rec. 487).
This court has held in J?olinsky v. Williams, supra,
that "the owner is entitled to recover the value of the use if
he prefers it to interest during the time he was deprived of
possession." In the case of Riekenberg v. Capitol Garage,
supra, this court holds "that the reasonable value of the
use * * * for the time it was wrongfully detained from the
owner constitutes the legal measure of damage." In the
first case, the automobile was held and could not be delivered. In the last case, a delivery of the automobile could be
had.
In the instant case, the equipment was sold by Siegel.
In any event, he has not made any tender to return the
equipment and has unlawfully detained the property from
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August 23rd, 1943, to the present time.
In the light of the cases quoted, the partnership of
Graham and Street is entitled to damages against Siegel as
a substitute for interest during the period of detention, the
rental value of the equipment detained from the time of the
taking up to at least the entry of the Memorandum Decision
of the lower court on May 24th, 1951.
Furthermore, Siegel and Street do not contend that
there was a conversion of the property, nor that this supreme court so held on the original appeal. Their whole new
defense is that Siegel is a substituted partner for Graham,
that faithful performance was made by said substituted
partner, and that the excluded partner Graham must accept
partner Siegel's accounting.
There is an attempt in the briefs of defendants to minimize the damage by showing deterioration of the partnership
equipment, and by showing that there were certain expenses
for repairs and the partnership equipment did not make any
money. There are no pleadl.ngs in their answers on which
to base such claims. The case of Dolinsky v. Williams,
supra, holds:
Counsel call attention to the principle that, if a party
detaining property did not use same, the deterioration
which it would have suffered by use as the owner
would have used it must be deducted from the value
of the use, and that in this case no deduction was
made because of deterioration. This issue was not
raised by defendant's answer. No instruction was requested upon the subject, and in no way is the ques50
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tion before us for review. It is apparent that in the
trial court appellant relied wholly upon his contention that in replevin when the value of the property
is fixed at the time of the taking the damages may
not exceed the interest on such value, and thus relying upon that theory of the case, counsel logically
perceived no reason for raising an issue which they
thought immaterial.
The Memorandum Decision (Rec. 475) and the subsequent Decree (Rec. 122) also minimize Siegel's damage, by
allowing him to take off one-half of the "partnership" earnings from his accounting. Siegel was not a partner in any
sense. His accounting should be to the partnership as this
court ordered and he should respond for the full damage to
the partnership and be required to pay to the partnership
rental for the entire period of the detention. Otherwise, he
will be allowed to profit by his own wrong, Montgomery v.
Gallas, reported in 225 SW., 557.

l1ll0

The appellants in their briefs make mention of excessive damages in proportion to the investments made by plaintiff. The record shows that plaintiff made all of the investments in the partnership, that he originally purchased the
equipment and turned it over to the partnership, that he
had contracts and good will in a going business which he
turned over to the partnership, the value of which was difficult to determine. The discussion of these matters will be
here made. We cite the case of Guerin v. Kirst, 202 P.2d,
10, as rather controlling in this situation. This is a California case. Said case is quoted as follows:
In a replevin action the owner may recover the value
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of the use of his property where the amount thereof
exceeds the interest on such value, inasmuch as the
latter measure does not furnish adequate compensation for the wrongful detention. Drinkhouse v. Van
Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 379, 260 P. 869; Tucker v. Hagerty, 37 Cal. App. 789, 792, 174 P. 908.
The opinion then goes on and states that it is the net
usable value which should be allowed, and that decline in
rental value should be considered. During the trial, defendant offered to show proof of these matters of deduction and
was refused by the lower court.
However, in that case, the wrongful withholder was an
innocent purchaser for value.

He thought he had actually

bought the tractor, and he had paid full value therefor.
There was no fraud involved in any way.
In this case, as heretofore shown, the lower court computed the rental value after the expense of upkeep had been
considered, and after decline in rental value of the tractor
was shown not to exist in this case. Likewise, Siegel appropriated this property to his own use through his fraudulent
manipulations, has made no pleadings which would raise
these issues, and the record is clear that the rental values
found by the court take into consideration all of the
matters listed by the California court in Guirin v. Kirst,
supra.
Allegation 11 of the supplemental complaint (Rec. 19)
alleges that had Graham been allowed to continue in the
partnership arrangement, the profits therefrom would have
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exceeded the fair, actual and reasonable rental value of the
equipment used in the operation of the partnership business.
Walter W. Kershaw testified that he knew Graham
well (Rec. 224) that he had observed him for "many hours"
in the execution and performance of respective contracts
(Rec. 229), and for several pages thereafter gives testimony
that such an operator should make in excess of the rental
value of the equipment. Our allegation 11 is proved.

c
THE PROPER MEASURE OF ACCOUNTING rn
THIS ACTION FOR THE FRAUDULENT APPROPRIATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS BY SIEGEL
TO HIS OWN USE IS THE TOTAL RECEIPTS RECEIVED BY HIM ON THESE CONTRACTS.
It goes without saying that the partnership should
have damages for the wrongful detention of its equipment
regardless of where the equipment was used, or if the equipment was not used, Dolinsky v. Williams, supra.

We then come to a discussion of the contracts with
Ohran Construction Company and Garf & Nelson which
this court has held were the property of the partnership
(Rec. 440, last paragraph). The court should have awarded
damages for the taking of these£g~tt.r,fi~ addition to the
rental value of the equipment.
Finding 11 of the original findings (Rec. 86) , which is
now the law of the case, finds that the only "business" that
plaintiff is seeking an accounting on is the following:
"To collect and misappropriate the funds earned in
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the operation of the equipment on the contracts of
Graham & Street."
This is the "business" referred to all the way through
the findings. Plaintiff has never been after the profits of
the Siegel-Street operation unless they were in excess of
the rental value which they were not.
Plaintiff's Exhibit F shows that the Ohran Construction
Company paid the sum of $5,327.75 to Siegel upon the Graham and Street account. Finding 12 of the original findings, (Rec. 86), finds that these funds were the property of
Graham and Street.
There are three items in the Accounting of Defendant,
Evan Street (Rec. 8) which refer to Garf & Nelson, one for
$307.50, one for $142.50, and one for $42.00, totalling
$592.00.
From these figures, Siegel has received $5,919.75 of
partnership funds on the "business" of the partnership.
In the replies to the answers of the defendants (Rec.
74-78 and Rec. 110-114) the plaintiff in no uncertain terms
sets forth the contention of plaintiff in paragraphs 2 in
each reply:
Replying to the last paragraph of paragraph II of
said Answer, plaintiff denies said paragraph and the
whole thereof, and alleges that except for the contracts entered into between the partnership of Graham and Street, and Ohran Construction Company
on the one part, and Garff and Nielson, on the other
part, none of the transactions shown in any of the
accountings filed by the defendants and each of them,
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and the supplements thereto, are matters and transactions of the partnership of Graham and Street;
that the plaintiff had no participation in any of said
matters except as stated, that plaintiff did not join
in the making of any of the disbursements or sales
set forth therein, and gave no consent to any of
the transactions, except for the entering into the two
contracts herein set forth but not for any disbursements thereunder. That all of said transactions
other than as above set forth were made by the defendants under their scheme to defraud the partnership of its assets and business to the detriment of the
plaintiff.
3. Replying to that part of paragraph III of said
Answer not stricken by the above entitled court,
plaintiff denies the allegations therein and the whole
thereof. Plaintiff further alleges that all of the proceeds from the operation of the partnership equipment were turned over to and completely handled
by the defendant, Max Siegel, which was in no manner contemplated and intended by the partners when
they undertook to form a partnership. Plaintiff further alleges that after September 22nd, 1943 the
whole management of the partnership equipment was
under the direction of the defendant, Max Siegel, and
that such management was not contemplated and
intended by the parties when they undertook to
form a partnership.
While these allegations were on matters which
had been adjudicated, plaintiff made them to clarify his
stand in this action. This supreme court is invited to read
all of these replies. If they are completely read, it can be
ascertained that the defendant, Siegel, was put upon notice
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that the plaintiff was seeking to determine what profit had
been made on the contracts with Ohran Construction Company and Garff & Nelson.
Had the defendants' accounts set forth in particularity
the items required therein instead of failing in many instances to show from whom receipts were received, or to
whom payments were made and what for, probably a culling out of the expenses could be made to separate the wheat
from the chaff.
Defendants could not segregate their expenses as to the
above partnership contracts (Rec. 149).
This being so, the defendants should account to the
partnership for the $5,919.75 in money of the partnership
which they have received.
In the case of Royer v. Dobbins, (Oklahoma) 239 P.

157, it is said:
All of the expenses claimed by the defendants were
incurred after he had repudiated the trust relation,
and it would not have been error for the court to
have disallowed the entire claim. Hobbs v. McLean,
117 U. S. 567, 6 S. Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940; Somerset
Ry. v. Pierce, 98 Me. 528, 57 A. 888; Hanna v. Clark,
204 Pa. 145, 53 A. 757; Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo.,
171, 20 P. 251; Snow v. Hazelwood, 179 F. 182, 102
C. C. A. 448; Lehman v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 270, 42
N. E. 777; Stone v. Farnham, 22 R.I. 225, 47 A. 211;
Fuller v. Abbe, 105 Wis. 235, 81 N. W. 401; Cook v.
Lowry, 95 N. Y. 103.
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D.
THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD ACCOUNT TO THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR DAMAGES CAUSED FOR DISRUPTING THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.
In paragraph C above, it is shown that at least $5,919.75
was received by the defendant Siegel from contracts belonging to Graham and Street. It is to be noted in passing that
the check No. 870 of the Ohran Construction Co., (Plaintiff's
Exhibit G) is not accounted for in either of the accountings
of the defendants (Rec. 6 to 16).
The total receipts reflected were $17,934.53 accordin~
to the accountings (Rec. 66). The receipts from partnership contracts were 33% of this total. The time required to
perform these contracts according to the accounts was not
in excess of 20% of the total time of operation. In other
words, these were the good contracts and showed the influence of Graham's management. The good will of this going
business should be at least the $5,000 allowed by the court
as compensatory damages for the reasons set forth by the
court.
In Johnson Oil Refining Co. of Dlinois et al. v. Elledge,
(Oklahoma), 53 P. (2d), 543, the court says:
The loss of profits proximately resulting from the
destruction of an established business constitutes an
element of damages recoverable for such destruction.
Wellington v. Spencer, 37 Okl. 461, 132 P. 675, 46 L.
R.A. (N. S.) 469. It has also been held that uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not prevent
57
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recovery, and, where it clearly appears that loss of
profits to a business has been suffered, it is proper
to let the jury determine what the loss probably was
from the best evidence the nature of the case admitted. Bishop-Babcock-Becker Co. v. Estes Drug Co.,
63 Okl. 117, 163 P. 276. See, also Ft. Smith & W. R.
Co. v. Williams, 30 Okl. 726, 121 P. 275, 40 L.R.A.
(N. S.) 494; Wellington v. Spencer, supra; Paolo Gas
Co. v Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 622, 44 P. 621,
54 Am. St. Rep. 598; McGinnis v. Studebaker Corporation of America, 75 Or. 519, 146 P. 825, 147 P. 525,
L.R.A. 1916B, 868, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1190, Border
City Ice & Coal Co. v. Adams, 69 Ark. 219, 62 S. W.
591; Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble et. al, 153 U. S.
540, 14 S. Ct. 876, 38 L. Ed. 814.
E.
THE PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE ALLOWED EXEMPLARY DAMAGES FOR THE FRAUD OF THE DEFENDANTS.
In Haycraft v. Adams, 82 Utah, 347, 24 Pac. 2 (d),

1110, the following rule is set forth:
"Exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages are such
damages as are in excess of the actual loss, and are
allowed where a tort is aggravated by evil motives,
actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or
fraud" Murphy v. Booth, 36 Utah, 285, 103 P. 768,
770.
This supreme court has held Siegel and Street guilty
of fraud. In their briefs on this appeal they are trying to
minimize the exemplary damages allowed by the lower
court by showing that such damages cannot be allowed in
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the dissolution of a partnership. We have not arrived at
the time when the partnership can be dissolved. Siegel, who
is not a partner, is still retaining title to the equipment of
the partnership under his contract of sale with Roberts and
Ferguson. (Plaintiff's Exhibit I.) He is still holding
$8,318.22 in the Continental National Bank and Trust Company (Plaintiff's Exhibit Q) which is from the operation
of the Siegel-Street owner-lease agreement. He has not
tendered this property back to the partnership, and if he
were sincere in his claim that he substituted himself for
Graham in the partnership of Graham and Street, he would
put this money in the account of Graham and Street as the
partners originally intended. Until an accounting is made
to the partnership of Graham and Street, there can be no
accounting within the partnership as there is nothing in
the partnership to wind up and terminate.
The award of $5,000.00 as punitive damages is not excessive in view of the considerable damage that Siegel and
Street have fraudulently imposed upon the partnership of
Graham and Street, and in particular, Arthur Graham.
POINT III.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO
ALLOW MAX SIEGEL RENTAL FOR THE CONVEYORLOADER.
In the memorandum decision of the lower court (Rec.
480), it is stated:
The evidence is not clear as to the date when Siegel's
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conveyor-loader came onto the job, or into Street's
hands, but Siegel received the Bill of Sale from Sumpsian in an envelope post-marked October 6, 1943.
The Court feels justified in assuming that Street had,
and used it from that time until the end of partnership operations on December 26, 1944. Plaintiff admits that the reasonable rental value of this piece
of equipment was $170.00 per month, and the Court
finds that that rate was the standard under the
Office of Price Administration Regulations in effect
at the time. Thus for the fifteen months it was
used, Siegel is entitled to credit in the sum of
$2,550.00 as rental for the conveyor-loader, instead
of the $2,720.00 claimed by him.
This is strange doctrine. In an action for accounting
wherein Graham is the innocent party who is suffering loss,
he is not allowed rental value on the equipment taken from
him, and this fraudulently, but is required to pay rental
value in the termination of the affairs of a partnership
from which he was excluded, to the fraudulently-insertedpartner Siegel, for equipment purchased by Siegel after
Graham was excluded from the partnership. Is this equity?
In paragraph 4 of the reply to Siegel's answer (Rec.

75), plaintiff alleged:
4. Replying to paragraph IV of said Answer not
stricken by the above entitled court, plaintiff denies
the allegations of said paragraph and the whole
thereof. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant Siegel
received in excess of the amounts paid for the additional equipment set forth in paragraph as mentioned in said Answer, from the Ohran Construction
Company on contracts entered into between the partnership of Graham and Street and the said Ohran
Construction Company; that said additional equ·p60
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ment was purchased for the purpose of completing
the contracts with the said Ohran Construction Company, which contracts the defendant Siegel fraudulently appropriated to his own use before the purchase of said additional equipment; and that said
Siegel purchased such additional equipment out of
the funds fraudulently appropriated by him from
the proceeds of contracts belonging to the partnership of Graham and Street. Plaintiff further alleges
that he had no knowledge of any lease by the partnership of Graham and Street whereby such partnership was to lease such additional equipment from the
defendant Siegel, and further alleges that any such
lease arrangement entered into without the consent
of this plaintiff was contrary to the partnership
agreement.
Plaintiff's Exhibit F shows that Siegel had received
$2,095.25 on the Ohran Construction Company contract before the end of the year 1943. The new equipment, including the conveyor-loader and truck, were purchased for
$2,000.00.
In carefully checking the law, plaintiff has found that
in order to recover the possession or the value of property
under an action of this kind, plaintiff must prove title. This
cannot be done as to the conveyor-loader, and so any claim
for rentals from that piece of equipment as partnership
equipment, will have to be decided against the plaintiff.
However, Siegel should not be given rental value for
his use of this equipment. There is no theory in fact or
law which will allow Siegel rental value from a partnership
which he claimed did not exist. He never made a claim for
rental value of this equipment in his original pleadings (Rec.
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404-406) or that it was leased to the partnership of Graham
and Street. In fact, his answer was that there was no partnership of Graham and Street, so how could he rent his
conveyor-loader to the partnership of Graham and Street?
FUrthermore, there is nothing in the record to show that
Graham ever participated in any such lease.
The defendants have gladly welcomed the granting of
rental value to them, and have accepted the amount of that
rental value gladly and with open arms. Can they now be
heard to complain if rental value is charged against them
in the accounting to the partnership of Graham and Street
which they have not yet made?
IV.

THE PLAINTIFF PROVED ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF HIS SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AND
SHOULD HAVE BEEN A WARDED JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

With the exception of paragraph 12 of the supplemental complaint (Rec. 17) and deducting rental value on the
conveyor loader and pickup truck, the allegations of plaintiff's complaint were fully proven as has been hereinbefore
set forth.
From the argument heretofore made, findings 2, 3, 6,
7, 9, 21, and that part of finding 25 except compensatory
damages and punitive damages, are all contrary to the
law of the case and the facts found in paragraphs 1, 4, 5,
8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and24.
(Rec. 115-121,). The Decree based on said findings is
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erroneous except as to the compensatory and punitive damages.

v.
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE APPEAL
FROM THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE HERETOFORE
ENTERED HEREIN THAT THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED ·TO PROFIT FROM THEIR OWN
WRONG.

HER

[1)!

It goes without saying, that Siegel is profiting by his
own wrong in the Decree (Rec. 115-122) in following par-

ticulars:
(1) He is allowed to take rental value on the conveyor
loader which was claimed in the original action to be h~s
own property operated by himself on his own contracts.
He denied the existence of the partnership and could not
rent it to the partnership.
(2)

In his accounting, he was allowed to deduct the

one-half interest owned by Street from his accounting.
(3)

tna~

He was not required to account for the detention

of the partnership equipment nor the proceeds of the partnership contracts which he appropriated to his own use.
Insofar as Street was concerned, he was allowed to
have one-half of the proceeds of the partnership of Graham
and Street which he repudiate<J and which he said did not
exist, and this is allowing him to profit by his own wrong.
He had received his wages from Siegel in their agreement
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to operate the equipment as Siegel's property.

As a joint

tort-feasor with Siegel he was not required to account for
the detention of the partnership equipment nor the proceeds
of the partnership contracts which were appropriated by
Siegel to his own use.
VI.

THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON JULY 12TH, 1952,
HEREIN DOES NOT MAKE THE PLAINTIFF, GRAHAM, WHOLE.
The judgment would give Graham approximately
$14,000.00 for eight years of being deprived of his assets
and business. This is less than $2,000.00 per year. By their
own accountings after paying Street wages, the SiegelStreet operation made $7,139.77 (Rec. 482), in 17 months.
This would amount to $5240 per year. From the fact that
the contracts which Graham turned over to the partnership
were 33% of the total business transacted, and that this was
done in 20% of the time, there is no telling what amount of
business could have been accomplished under Graham's
management.
Then again, the business could have grown as it was
growing under Graham's supervision before the entry of
Street into a partnership agreement with Graham, and
while this is speculative, it is reasonable to assume from
the opinion of this court (Rec. 438) that because of the
scarcity of equipment (which still exists) that a considerable business could have been built up if Street had remained faithful to Graham.
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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the premise used by
the defendants in both of their briefs that this action is
only for a partnership accounting, and that the self-injected
partner, Siegel, is herein accounting in the place of the
ejected partner, Graham, has failed, and that the lower
court in following this premise has done so contrary to and
not in compliance with the law of the case heretofore established in the appeal from the Interlocutory Decree and
the Mandamus proceeding heretofore decided by this court.
The accountings should be settled on the basis set
forth by the plaintiff in this brief to do substantial justice
and to prevent the defendants from profiting by their own
wrongs. That by so doing, neither defendant will be penalized and the plaintiff will not be unjustly enriched.
The accountings of the two defendants should first be
made to the partnership of Graham and Street. After th.is
is done, and the accounts are settled and paid, the partnership will have something to distribute in a partership accounting to wind up its affairs.
The defendant, Siegel, the guiding light of Street in
this case, appears to be using Street as a tool to further his
fraudulent machinations, and if Street is allowed any credit
for being a partner, it is apparent that Siegel will use these
credits for his own purposes as he has used the partnership
equipment and money. Street is now represented by Siegel's
original counsel.
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All of the evidence that can be produced is now before
this supreme court. It has original equity jurisdiction. If
this court does not desire to exercise this original equity
jurisdiction, plaintiff does not feel that it will sustain the
lower court in going contrary to the law of the case. If
such is the case, this supreme court should in no uncertain
terms instruct the lower court what to do so that this case
can be wound up with dispatch.
Plaintiff submits this brief with confidence that he
will receive equity.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B. STANLEY
DAVID L. McKAY

Attorneys for Respondent,
Arthur Graham.
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